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ABSTRACT
The present study examined the relation between self-report mindfulness and
performance on tasks measuring abilities for three aspects of attention: sustained, selective, and
attention switching. Because attention regulation has been described as a core component of
mindfulness, and past research suggests that experience with mindfulness meditation is
associated with improved attentional skills, the present study predicted that higher self-report
mindfulness would be positively related to performance on tasks of attention. Fifty
undergraduate students completed self-report mindfulness questionnaires and completed a
battery of attention tasks. There was mixed support for the relation between mindfulness scores
and sustained attention, such that higher mindfulness scores as measured by the MAAS and
CAMS-R were negatively related to target omissions on the CPT-II, but were not related to RT
variability on the CPT-II or PASAT performance. Findings are discussed in the context of the
measurement of self-report mindfulness, and directions for future research are considered.
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1
The Relation Between Self-Report Mindfulness and
Performance on Tasks of Attention
Mindfulness has been defined as, “the awareness that emerges through paying attention
on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience,
moment to moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; p. 144), and as “deliberate non-evaluative contact with
events that are here and now” (Hayes & Wilson, 2003; p. 164). The above definitions outline
three notable components consistently addressed in the mindfulness literature: (1) the conscious
attempt to regulate attention, (2) a focus on present experience, and (3) the maintenance of a
nonjudgmental attitude toward current experience. Whereas the origins of mindfulness reside in
Buddhist meditation, the techniques have been increasingly incorporated into Western mental
health treatment programs. Mindfulness training is an integral part of newer cognitive and
behavioral therapies such as Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982),
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), Dialectical
Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT;
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), and it has demonstrated promise as an intervention in the
treatment of chronic pain, stress, anxiety, depressive relapse, and disordered eating (Baer, 2003;
Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998).
Recent literature has emphasized the importance of developing reliable and valid
measurement of the construct of mindfulness so that research can begin to investigate the
efficacy of current mindfulness interventions, mechanisms through which mindfulness may
facilitate clinical change, as well as the role that mindfulness may play within multifaceted
treatment programs (Strauman & Merrill, 2004; Bishop et al., 2004; Hayes & Feldman, 2004;
Dimidjian & Linehan, 2003). Toward that end, several self-report instruments assessing
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mindfulness recently have been developed (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Bishop et al., 2003;
Brown & Ryan, 2003; Feldman et al., 2005). Although initial validation of these measures has
been promising, comparisons with non-self-report instruments measuring constructs related to
mindfulness may be an important step in ensuring more valid measurement in future research
(Bishop et al., 2004). Because the deliberate regulation of attention is a core component of
mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 2005; Baer, 2003; Bishop et al., 2003), and because past research has
provided evidence suggesting that mindfulness meditation leads to improvements in various
aspects of attention (Valentine & Sweet, 1999, Rani & Andhra, 2000; Rani & Rao, 1996; Linden,
1973), comparison of self-reported mindfulness with performance tests of attention may be an
important step in validating these measures.
To contribute to the empirical literature regarding the measurement of mindfulness, the
present study examined the relation between self-reported mindfulness and performance on tasks
measuring abilities for three aspects of attention: sustained, selective, and attention switching
ability. To build a rationale for the present study, a review of the following topics is presented:
(1) a brief description of mindfulness interventions and current issues regarding mindfulness
research, (2) the role of attention in mindfulness, (3) attention tasks included in the present study,
and (4) development of self-report mindfulness measures.
Mindfulness Interventions
Probably the most widely recognized mindfulness intervention is MBSR, an eight to ten
week program in which participants meet as a group for two hours a week for instruction and
practice of mindfulness skills, and are assigned meditation exercises to be practiced daily for 45
minutes. This intervention has been used to treat chronic pain, anxiety, and other stress-related
disorders. Bringing attention to the present moment is taught as a coping skill, as well as a way
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to enrich one’s life through increased awareness and insight into one’s experience (Kabat-Zinn,
1992).
MBCT is an eight week group treatment that is largely based on the MBSR program, but
is designed to prevent depressive relapse. Segal and colleagues (2002) propose that those who
have experienced major depressive episodes may reinitiate patterns of depressive thinking in the
face of stress or dysphoria. Mindfulness practice is taught to increase one’s ability to recognize
negative thoughts and emotions as transient experiences that come and go, and not necessarily as
accurate reflections of reality. Thus moments of discomfort and negative thinking may be less
likely to escalate into ruminative patterns and depressive symptoms.
DBT and ACT are interventions that incorporate mindfulness into multifaceted treatment
programs. DBT is designed specifically for the treatment of patients with Borderline Personality
Disorder. Mindfulness is incorporated with the teaching of interpersonal effectiveness, emotion
regulation, and distress tolerance skills. Less emphasis is placed on regular meditation practice;
exercises include mindful awareness of everyday activities such as washing the dishes or
walking (Linehan, 1992).
Although meditation is not formally described in ACT, exercises are employed that
encourage mindful attention to one’s thoughts and emotions. Clients are taught to identify with
the part of themselves that is capable of observing their own thoughts and emotions. ACT
teaches this “decentered” view to encourage nonjudgmental acceptance of negative internal
experience in the context of changing one’s behavior in constructive ways that are of value to the
client (Hayes et al., 1999). Although the above mentioned programs have shown early promise
(Baer, 2003), subtle differences between these interventions highlight the need to systematically
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investigate the mechanisms of action for mindfulness skills before extensive further treatment
development takes place.
Methods of Action
Recent reviews (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006; Baer, 2003) have outlined
several potential mechanisms that may explain how mindfulness skills can lead to symptom
reduction and behavior change. Attention to present experience may provide the opportunity for
prolonged exposure to previously avoided sensations of pain or anxiety. Nonjudgmental
observation of these experiences may lead to desensitization, reducing the likelihood of fear and
avoidance responses normally elicited by these sensations. As mentioned above, mindfulness
interventions are thought to provide a different perspective on thoughts and emotions, in which
they are viewed as transient entities that are separate from the person having them. Thoughts
such as “I am a bad person”, might be viewed as, “I am having the thought that I am a bad
person,” and thus become less threatening and distressful (Kohlenberg, Hayes, & Tsai, 1993).
Increased attention to present experience may also provide the opportunity for improved
affect regulation and self-management by interrupting the automatic way in which our thought
processes work throughout daily life (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). “The idea is that automatic and typical
reactions now become a choice as opposed to an inevitability.” (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; p. 43) For
example, someone who is stuck in traffic, instead of immediately becoming frustrated and
disdainful of their situation may now realize that they have some unexpected time to spend with
their child who is seated next to them (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Experiencing of this kind
encourages cognitive flexibility and the opportunity for additional learning through clarity of
experience (Shapiro et al., 2006).
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Although relaxation is not a specific goal of mindfulness meditation, past research
suggests that various meditation exercises are effective as relaxation techniques (Baer, 2003;
Orme-Johnson, 1984). In addition, the attitude of acceptance that is taught in mindfulness may
be important in encouraging participants to experience thoughts and emotions more fully, again
decreasing the likelihood of avoidance behavior. Hayes (1999) describes acceptance as a way of
teaching participants the ability to “carry” difficult emotions, which are an inevitable part of
human experience, while working toward a fulfilling life.
Current literature has emphasized that before research continues regarding the way in
which mindfulness may be beneficial, agreement should be reached on an operational definition
of mindfulness, and reliable measurement developed (Bishop et al., 2004; Hayes & Feldman,
2004; Dimidjian & Linehan, 2003). Although several operational definitions have recently been
proposed that are in accord with the majority of the mindfulness literature (Bishop et al., 2004;
Shapiro et al., 2006), there is a consistent call to develop empirically defined components of this
construct (Hayes & Shenk, 2004). Efforts to develop reliable measurement may be a valuable
step toward agreement about the functional components of mindfulness (Baer et al., 2004). To
further validate the self-report instruments that have been developed, the present study focused
on one of the foundational components, attention.
Mindfulness and Attention
The role of attention in mindfulness is most clearly evident in the various exercises
involved in mindfulness training. Most often, the first step is the practice of focusing one’s
attention on a single aspect of one’s field of awareness, most commonly one’s breath. The
participant will typically be instructed to focus on sensations associated with normal breathing.
When attention inevitably wanders to other perceptions or thoughts, participants are encouraged
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to observe the content of the distraction without judgment, and gently bring their attention back
to their breathing as a way of refocusing attention to present experience. Throughout the practice
of mindfulness, a non-judgmental attitude is cultivated in order to discourage judgmental
thoughts that may serve as a distortion of simple awareness of present experience. Concentrative
focus on specific aspects of present experience may lead to meditation that has a broader focus,
in which one engages in observing whatever comes into the field of awareness (Kabat-Zinn,
2005). Importantly, each of the different forms of meditation involves bringing attention to the
present moment. Some forms focus on a specific idea or sensation, such as breathing, whereas
others try to stay receptive to all aspects of current experience. These exercises are performed in
order to increase one’s attention to and awareness of present experience, not only during
meditation exercises, but throughout daily life (Kabat-Zinn, 2005; Linehan, 1992).
Although cognitive psychology delineates many different aspects of attentional abilities,
recent literature (Bishop et al., 2004; Shapiro et al., 2006) suggests three areas that may be
associated with mindfulness skills: a) sustained attention; defined as the capacity to maintain
vigilance over time (Posner & Rothbart, 1992), b) selective attention; the ability to select salient
information for additional cognitive processing (Treisman, 1969), and c) switching; the ability to
switch the focus of one’s attention from one object or mental set to another (Posner, 1980).
Sustained attention is thought to be associated with mindfulness practice in that vigilance
is required to maintain focus on present experience. Valentine and Sweet (1999) found that
experienced meditators performed better than controls on the Wilkins’ counting test, a task of
sustained attention which requires counting the number of “auditory bleeps” in a series. As the
trials proceed, there are increasingly shorter intervals separating the tones, requiring more
focused, continuous attention to discern. These findings suggest that meditation may improve
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one’s performance on tasks requiring sustained attention, presumably through practice in
maintaining focus on present experience. In addition, more experienced meditators scored higher
than those with less experience, suggesting that meditation may continue to improve sustained
attention the longer one practices.
In the practice of formal meditation or daily mindful activity, one must choose to focus
on present moment experience. Although all thoughts or sensations that arise during mindfulness
practice are regarded as “objects of observation,” selective attention is required to inhibit further
engagement in habitual thought processes so that attention can be reoriented to the present
moment (Bishop et al., 2004). Early research found that children ages 8-11 who underwent 18
weeks (twice weekly) of focused breathing meditation were better able to focus attention and
ignore distracting stimuli than classroom peers (Linden, 1973). Rani and Rao (2000) found that
experienced transcendental meditators (those who practice “cognitive exercise of internal
attention”) performed better than controls on the Stroop task, a test of selective attention that
requires one to inhibit the automatic response of reading when the required task is to instead
name the color in which words are printed. Alexander et al. (1989) found that elderly participants
trained in meditation over 12 weeks (practiced twice daily for 20 minutes) performed better on
the Stroop task than those trained in a creative word production task, and those in a no-training
group. These results suggest that mindfulness meditation taught in a structured, time-limited
treatment setting may also lead to improved selective attention ability and that the effects of
mindfulness training on attention can be differentiated from the effects of other mental activities
on attention.
In another study examining selective attention and mindfulness training, Wenk-Sormaz
(2005) assigned 120 undergraduates without previous meditation experience to one of three
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attention task groups: (1) meditation on the breath, (2) a mnemonic learning task, and (3) a “rest”
group instructed to let their minds wander. Participants were given the Stroop task before and
after the 20 minute attention task. The meditation group showed significantly improved Stroop
performance, whereas the learning task group and the rest group did not. These results suggest
that by improving one’s selective attention skill, meditation has the ability to reduce habitual
responding (i.e. word reading) in the short term, even when the intervention is very brief (WenkSormaz, 2005).
The ability to switch attention from one mental set to another may be important in
orienting attention to the present moment in mindful practice (Bishop et al., 2004). This skill
allows one to disengage from thought processes that may serve as distractions from present
focused attention. Rani and Rao (1996) found that children (ages 9-11) who practiced
transcendental meditation as part of their school curriculum demonstrated greater attention
regulation capacity as measured by the Star Counting Test than age and sex matched controls.
This task requires one to count a series of “stars” (*s) while switching from counting forward to
counting backward throughout each series. Attention regulation is thought to be measured
through the ability to switch one’s mental set throughout the task to arrive at the correct answer.
Similar results were obtained from college students who meditated regularly compared to nonmeditating controls, but only when testing occurred soon after meditating (Rani & Rao, 2000).
Because measurement soon after meditation was not necessary in order to see a significant
difference between groups on a selective attention task included in this study, the authors suggest
that improved attention ability may be stable for some processes and transitory for others, such
as attention switching.
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In summary, the small group of research studies that has examined the relation between
meditation and attention task performance has found that those who practice meditation perform
better on various aspects of attention than those without meditation experience (Alexander et al.,
1989; Rani & Rao, 1996 & 2000; Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Thus, these
studies suggest that performance on attention tasks should be positively related to self-reported
measures of mindfulness.
Attention Tasks
Although a detailed examination of current research regarding the delineation of different
aspects of attention is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that aspects of attention
are thought to operate in a hierarchical manner such that certain higher order functions are
required to perform lower order tasks of attention (Mapou, 1995). For example Cohen and
colleagues (1993) describe a model of attention in which one must maintain attention (sustained
attention) in order to engage faculties of selective attention. Likewise, the process of selecting a
stimulus on which to focus (selective attention) and switching one’s attention from a previous
stimulus or mental set (attention switching) are likely intertwined (Cohen et al., 1993). Therefore
tasks designed to measure the different aspects of attention inherently contain some overlap,
making it difficult to individually measure any one component of attention ability. With these
constraints in mind it is important to examine the tasks included in the present study and how
they have been proposed to measure sustained, selective, and attention switching ability.
Performance Tests of Sustained Attention
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test – II (CPT-II). The CPT-II (Conners, 2002) is a
widely used computer administered test of sustained attention in which letters appear one at a
time on the computer monitor, and participants are required to press the “space” bar for each
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letter except for “X.” Participants are asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
The task, which runs for about 14 minutes, requires sustained vigilance to press for each letter
other than “X,” as well as to inhibit responding when “X” appears. This test produces
standardized T-scores based on the age and gender of the participant. Two scores that are often
associated with sustained attention are a) Omissions; the number of times the participant failed to
respond to a target letter (higher T-scores indicate a greater number of omissions), and b) Hit RT
Standard Error; the consistency of response time (in milliseconds) to targets throughout the task
(higher T-scores indicate a greater variability of reaction times) (Riccio, & Reynolds, 2003).
The Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT). The PASAT (Gronwall & Sampson,
1974) is a measure of sustained attention that requires participants to sum 60 pairs of digits
derived from a sequence of digits such that each is added to the digit immediately preceding it.
For example if the participant is presented with the series 2-6-9-5-3, the participant would begin
responding as soon as the examiner said “six” and the correct responses would be, “8-15-14-8.”
Typically, four sets of 61 digits are included in this task in which the digits are presented at
increasingly shorter intervals during each set (2.4, 2, 1.6, and 1.2 seconds respectively).
Sustained attention is required to maintain focus during this difficult task. Participants who are
able to maintain their attention and quickly refocus after a lapse of attention will presumably
provide more correct responses across the four trials. Because this test requires precise
presentation, computer or audio tape administration is used. Scores are calculated as the
percentage of total correct responses across all four sets. Although the task may also require the
use of working memory skill, factor analysis has shown that the PASAT is more highly
correlated with other tests of attention than with tests of working memory (Larrabee & Curtiss,
1995). Because both the CPT and the PASAT require sustained attention to current experience
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for optimal performance, these tasks should provide a good test of the sustained attentional
ability thought to be associated with mindful attention.
Performance Tests of Selective Attention
The Stroop task. The Stroop task has been widely used as a measure of selective attention
(MacLeod, 1991). This task measures attention through one’s ability to inhibit the automatic
response of reading when the required task is to name the color in which words are printed
(MacLeod, 2005; Galotti, 1999). John Ridley Stroop’s (1935) original research found that it took
longer to name colors of incongruent color-word combinations (e.g., the word red written in
green ink, say “green”) than it did to name the colors of colored shapes (e.g., for a red rectangle,
say “red”). The differential latency to name the color between the two conditions is known as the
Stroop effect. This research introduced the notion of “automaticity” which states that the more
one practices a task, such as reading or driving, the less attention it takes to perform it (Galotti,
1999). Because most literate adults have so much practice reading, it has become an automatic
response. In fact, reading is so well practiced and requires so little attention that when confronted
with written stimuli, not-reading becomes difficult (Galotti, 1999). When asked to name the
color of incongruent color-word combinations participants must invest attention into this
unfamiliar task in order to inhibit the automatic response of reading and select the salient
information (ink color) for further processing. Shorter color-naming latency and fewer colornaming errors are associated with greater selective attention abilities.
The Stroop task may be especially effective as an objective measure of mindfulness
because mindful attention requires a similar investment of attention in aspects of experience that
are often ignored. For example, the Stroop task, in which one is required to focus attention on the
infrequently performed task of naming the color in which words are printed, is an experimental
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paradigm that nicely parallels the clinical application of mindfulness training in which one is
instructed to focus attention on typically overlooked sensations, such as breathing (WenkSormaz, 2005; Alexander et al., 1989).
The present study included two variations of the Stroop (1935) task to measure selective
attention; a) the Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System (D-KEFS), Color-Word
Interference Test, and b) a computer administered, cued, single-trial version of the Stroop task.
The D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test is similar to the traditional Stroop task in that
separate blocks of like trials are performed for each condition. Condition 1 (Color Naming)
consists of the basic naming of color patches, Condition 2 (Word Reading) is the basic reading of
color-words printed in black ink, Condition 3 (Inhibition) requires color naming of incongruent
color words, and Condition 4 (Inhibition/Switching) requires one to switch back and forth
between reading and naming the ink color of incongruent color words. Performance is measured
in the rate (in seconds) and accuracy with which participants complete the 50 trials that are
included in each condition. Standardized Stroop interference scores based on age and gender are
calculated. Standardized scores are also calculated for the number of color naming errors made
on the Inhibition condition. If there is a significant relation between this task and self-report
mindfulness, it may be interesting to examine how mindfulness scores correspond with
performance on this nationally standardized test of attention ability.
A computerized, cued, single-trial version of the Stroop (Cohen et al., 1999; Seignourel
et al., 2005) was also included to provide a more sensitive measurement of selective attention, as
well as provide a more ecologically valid comparison of the skills required in mindful activity in
daily life. In this task trials are presented individually and participants receive an audio cue prior
to each trial to either read the word or name the ink color in which the word is printed. Task
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instruction (word reading or color naming) varies randomly across trials. Presentation in this
format requires one to select the appropriate salient material for further processing based on the
context of the instructions for each specific trial. This may provide a more valid measure of the
manner in which one is required to select present moment related information based on
contextual cues throughout daily life. Because mean reaction times used to calculate Stroop
interference scores are measured in milliseconds, this task is likely to be more sensitive to
individual differences than the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test or other traditional Stroop
tasks that are not computer administered.
Performance Tests of Switching Attention
Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System (DKEFS), Color-Word Interference Test.
Condition 4 of the D-KEFS (Inhibition/Switching) requires one to switch back and forth between
reading and naming the ink color of incongruent color words. In an attempt to isolate the
attention switching component of this task the D-KEFS provides an Inhibition/Switching vs.
Inhibition contrast score for which performance on the Inhibition condition is factored out of
performance on the Inhibition/Switching condition. Standardized scores are also calculated for
the number of color naming or reading errors made on the Inhibition/Switching condition.
Participant’s ability to switch their focus back and forth from reading the word to naming the ink
color may provide a good measure of the ability needed to reorient attention to present
experience in mindfulness.
In summary, these tasks are designed to measure three aspects of attention regulation
thought to be associated with mindfulness skills and that past research suggests are associated
with meditation experience. Therefore, performance on these tasks should be related to selfreported measures of mindfulness, which are reviewed next.
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Measuring Mindfulness by Self-Report
Indicative that mindfulness scholars consider the regulation of attention to present
experience as a core component of mindfulness, each self-report instrument developed thus far
has included items assessing one’s subjective experience of attention to, and awareness of
present experience either in a meditation setting or throughout daily life. The proposed study will
use three measures that have been designed to measure levels of mindfulness in the general
population: the Mindful Awareness Assessment Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), the
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004), and the Cognitive and
Affective Mindfulness Scale, Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman & Hayes, 2004). Not discussed here
are the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (Buchheld, Grossman, & Walach, 2001) which was
designed for use with experienced meditators only, and the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Bishop
et al., 2003) which was designed to assess the degree to which one is able to reach a mindful
state during a meditation exercise.
MAAS
The MAAS is a 15-item, single factor instrument that measures one’s tendency to
function on “automatic pilot” without attention to present experience (See Appendix B). Typical
items that are rated on a six-point likert scale (almost always – almost never) include, “I forget a
person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time,” and “I could be experiencing
some emotion, and not be conscious of it until some time later.” The authors note that other
aspects of mindfulness, such as maintaining a nonjudgmental attitude, or proposed consequences
of mindfulness, such as calmness and emotional well-being, are not addressed because they felt
that present-centered attention and awareness were the “foundational” components of
mindfulness. Although they acknowledge that acceptance is important in mindfulness, they feel
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that it is an understood quality necessary to pay full attention to the present moment (Brown &
Ryan, 2004). In addition, during assessment of criterion validity for the MAAS, Brown and Ryan
(2001; as cited in Brown & Ryan, 2004) found that items related to a non-judgmental attitude
such as, “I don’t like feelings of fear and anger, so I don’t allow myself to experience them,” did
not add any explanatory information to the measure.
As part of their validity assessment, Brown and Ryan (2003) compared MAAS scores
from general-community adults to those from members of a community Zen center. Participants
currently practicing meditation had significantly higher scores than those from the generalcommunity sample. In addition, the number of years of meditation practice was positively
associated with MAAS scores. These findings suggest that those practicing meditation report
increased attention to and broader awareness of present experience in daily life as measured by
the MAAS.
KIMS
The KIMS is a 39-item instrument that measures mindfulness based on the four
components addressed in Linehan’s model associated with Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT)
(See Appendix C). The four factors are (1) observe; the tendency to observe or notice more
subtle stimuli in one’s environment, (2) describe; the ability to describe thoughts and feelings as
they arise, (3) act with awareness; the tendency to focus undivided attention to current activity,
and (4) accept without judgment; the tendency to allow experiences to occur without judging
them as negative or positive (Baer et al., 2004). Although there appears to be some overlap
among these factors, the act with awareness factor most directly captures the regulation of
attention to present experience that has been discussed as foundational to mindfulness.
Therefore, it is this factor score that one would expect to be positively associated with
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performance on an attention task. Items that load on this factor include, “When I am reading, I
focus all my attention on what I’m reading,” and “When I do things, my mind wanders off and
I’m easily distracted” (reverse scored). Furthermore, Baer and colleagues (2004) examined the
correlations between KIMS scores and the MAAS in a sample of 115 undergraduates. The
MAAS was strongly positively correlated with the act with awareness scale of the KIMS, and
moderately positively correlated with the Describe, and Accept without Judgment scales. No
significant relation was observed between MAAS scores and the Observe scale of the KIMS.
CAMS-R
The CAMS-R is a 12-item, single factor instrument that derives its higher-order construct
of mindfulness from four components: a) the regulation of attention, b) orientation to present
experience, c) awareness of experience, and d) acceptance/non-judgment towards experience
(See Appendix D). The CAMS-R uses non-specialized language with the aim of measuring
mindfulness in the general population. Typical items that are rated on a four-point likert scale
(rarely/not at all – almost always) include, “I am able to pay close attention to one thing for a
long period or time,” “I am able to accept the thoughts and feelings that I have,” and “I am
preoccupied by the past” (reverse scored). Although correlations between the CAMS-R and other
measures of mindfulness have not been published, a sample of 613 undergraduates demonstrated
that the original CAMS was strongly related to both the MAAS and the KIMS (Baer et al.,
2006). The specific correlation of the CAMS to the act with awareness scale of the KIMS was
not reported. Although the CAMS-R is a single factor instrument that includes items assessing
acceptance and non-judgment of present experience, three of the four components (the regulation
of attention, orientation to present experience, and awareness of experience) all overlap with the
philosophy invoked in the design of the MAAS and the act with awareness scale of the KIMS; to
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assess one’s tendency to pay attention to, and be aware of, current experience. In summary, all
three measures included in the present study include assessment of this core component of the
practice of mindfulness that is thought to be associated with improved attention ability.
Study Objectives and Hypotheses
The purpose of the present study was to further validate several self-report instruments
designed to assess mindfulness in the general population. Because the regulation of attention to
present experience is consistently discussed as a core component of mindfulness, and because
research suggests that mindful meditation leads to improvements in attention abilities, those
scoring higher on self-report mindfulness are predicted to perform better on tasks of attention.
Specifically, the following hypotheses are made:
Sustained Attention
a) On the CPT-II, the number of Omission errors (Omission T-scores) and the amount of
variance in participant’s reaction times (Hit RT Standard Error T-scores) will be
negatively related to self-report mindfulness as measured by the MAAS, the KIMS-act
with awareness subscale, and the CAMS-R.
b) Mindfulness scores (MAAS, KIMS-act with awareness, & CAMS-R) will be positively
related to the percentage of correct responses on the PASAT.
Selective Attention
a) On the cued, single-trial Stroop task, latency to name the color of incongruent colorwords (Stroop Interference score) and the number of color naming errors will be
negatively related to self-report mindfulness scores (MAAS, KIMS-act with awareness,
& CAMS-R).
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b) On the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test, shorter latency to name the color of
incongruent color-words as indicated by higher Inhibition vs. Color Naming scaled
scores, and fewer color naming errors (higher Inhibition error analysis scaled scores) will
be positively related to mindfulness scores (MAAS, KIMS-act with awareness, &
CAMS-R).
Switching Attention
a) In addition, mindfulness scores (MAAS, KIMS-act with awareness, & CAMS-R) will be
positively related to Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition scaled scores and
Inhibition/Switching error analysis scaled scores (fewer errors).
Methods
Participants
Participants were 51 volunteers from undergraduate introductory psychology courses at
Georgia State University (GSU), who received two hours of class research credit for their
participation. One participant withdrew prior to completing the self-report mindfulness measures
and therefore her data were excluded reducing the number of participants to 50. Comprising an
ethnically diverse sample, 25 (50%) self-identified as Caucasian, 11 (22%) as African American,
9 (18%) as Asian, 1 (2%) as Hispanic, 1 (2%) as West Indian, 1 (2%) as Iranian, and 2 (4%) as
being biracial. Their mean age was 20.34 (range = 18 – 35), 41 (82%) were female and 48 (96%)
had never been married. The sample reported little meditation experience with 9 participants
having had some previous exposure to meditation, and 7 who currently practiced. However of
these 7, only two reported any consistent practice (twice a week for the past eight months, & 60
minutes a week for the past four months). Those with meditation experience (n = 9) did not differ
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from non-mediators (n = 41) on levels of self-report mindfulness. The GSU Institutional Review
Board (IRB) monitored this research.
Materials
Self-Report Mindfulness
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS is a 15item, single factor self-report measure assessing individual differences in the frequency of
mindful states over time. Participants rate the degree to which they function without awareness
in daily life. Items are rated on a six-point likert scale (1 = almost always to 6 = almost never).
Authors report internal consistency alphas ranging from .82 to .87. Test-retest reliability analysis
with a sample of undergraduates revealed average item scores of 3.78 at time one, and 3.77 at
time two (after four weeks) were not significantly different, t(59) = .11. As mentioned above,
meditators score higher on the MAAS than non-meditators. Scores for this instrument range from
15 to 90.
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004). The KIMS is a 39item self-report measure of mindfulness skills on which participants rate how often each
statement is generally true for them using a five-point likert scale (1 = never or very rarely true,
to 5 = very often or always true). The items load on four factors; observing, describing, acting
with awareness, and accepting without judgment. Only the act with awareness subscale was used
for the present study. The authors report adequate internal consistency, with an alpha level of .76
for the act with awareness subscale. Scores on this subscales range from 10 to 50.
Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale – Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman et al., 2005).
The CAMS-R is a 12 item, single factor measure of mindfulness skills on which participants rate
how often each statement applies to them using a four-point likert scale (1 = rarely/not at all, to 4
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= almost always). Items are designed to assess four components thought to comprise the overall
construct of mindfulness; the regulation of attention, orientation to present experience, awareness
of experience, and acceptance/non-judgment towards experience. Authors report internal
consistency alphas ranging from .76 to .85. Scores on this measure range from 12 to 48.
Sustained Attention Tasks
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test II (CPT-II; Conners’, 2000). In this version of
the CPT letters are presented sequentially on a computer monitor and participants are instructed
to press the “space” bar for every letter other than the letter “X.” The task includes six blocks,
each with three 20-trial sub-blocks. Within the six blocks, each sub-block employs a different
inter-stimulus interval (ISI): 1, 2, or 4 seconds. The order of the sub-blocks varies across the six
main blocks of the task. Each letter is displayed for 250 milliseconds. This version of the CPT-II
was run using PsychManager software on a Windows Personal Computer (PC) (Multi-Health
Systems Inc., 2000). Participant’s scores of sustained attention were calculated from the number
of target omissions (CPT II-Omissions) and variability (CPT II-Hit RT Std. Error) of reaction
times (milliseconds) across the six blocks of the task. Higher T-scores indicate poorer
performance on both scales.
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT; Gronwall & Sampson, 1974). For this task,
participants are required to add adjacent pairs of digits from a string of single digits that are
presented orally via audio tape, such that each digit is added to the one immediately preceding it.
Participants are required to report the sums aloud as the digits are being read. A researcher was
present to record all responses. This task consists of four blocks of 61 digits. The intervals
between digits decrease as the blocks proceed (2.4, 2, 1.6, and 1.2 seconds respectively). A
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practice string of 10 digits precedes task administration. Scores are calculated as the percentage
of total correct responses across all four sets.
Selective Attention Tasks
Computerized, Cued, Single-trial Stroop Task (Cohen et al., 1999). For this version of the
Stroop task, participants were presented with an auditory instructional cue to either read the word
(“word”) or name the ink color in which the word was printed (“color”) prior to each trial.
Following a one second interval, the stimulus was presented, and remained on the screen until
the participant responded. A one second inter-trial interval preceded the subsequent trial
instructions. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Reaction times (RTs) were determined by a voice-activated PST Serial Response Box, model
#200a (19,200 baud standard communications with a transmission rate of 1,600 characters per
second). The examiner was present in order to record the participant’s responses and verify
accuracy. This task included four different conditions that were randomly intermixed throughout
the test; a) a reading condition in which the stimuli were color-words displayed in white, b) a
reading condition in which the stimuli were incongruent color-words, c) a color-naming
condition in which the stimuli were four colored Xs, and d) a color-naming condition in which
the stimuli were incongruent color-words. The task consisted of 12 practice items (three of each
condition), followed by 180 trials (45 trials per condition).The different color words and colorword combinations were evenly distributed throughout each condition. The stimulus colors and
words were red, blue, and green. The trial stimuli appeared in the middle of the screen on a black
background and words were printed in lowercase except for the string of Xs that were capital
letters. The stimuli were created using Microsoft PowerPoint software (44 point courier new
font) and presented on a PC using E-Prime software (display refresh rate range = 74.966 - 75.006
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Hz). Cued Stroop interference scores were determined by subtracting participant’s average
latency (in milliseconds) to name the color of the strings of Xs (control condition) from their
average latency to name the color of incongruent color-words. Incorrect responses were removed
from the average latency calculations and counted (Cued Stroop errors). Word-reading data was
not included as it was not of primary interest for the present study.
Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System (D-KEFS), Color-Word Interference Test
(Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). The Inhibition vs. Color Naming contrast score and the
Inhibition Error Analysis score from this task were used as measures of selective attention ability
in the present study. The Inhibition vs. Color Naming contrast score is a standardized scaled
scores based on age and gender derived by factoring out performance on the Color Naming
condition from performance on the Inhibition condition. The Inhibition Error Analysis score is
derived from the number of color naming errors made on the Inhibition condition of this task.
Higher scaled scores (ss) indicate shorter latency to name the color of incongruent color words
and fewer color naming errors.
Attention Switching Task
Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System (D-KEFS), Color-Word Interference Test
(Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). The Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition contrast score and the
Inhibition/Switching Error Analysis score from this task were used as measures of attention
switching ability in the present study. The Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition contrast score is a
standardized scaled scores based on age and gender derived by factoring out performance on the
Inhibition condition from performance on the Inhibition/Switching condition. The
Inhibition/Switching Error Analysis score is derived from the number of color naming errors
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made on the Inhibition/Switching condition of this task. Higher scaled scores (ss) indicate shorter
latency to complete the Inhibition/Switching condition, and fewer reading/color naming errors.
Procedure
Participants were recruited using Sona Systems, a website through which members of
introductory psychology classes at GSU were able to get information regarding this study and
sign up for available research appointment times. Participants were tested individually and all
study visits were conducted in an assessment room of the GSU Psychology Clinic. Testing took
approximately one hour and fifteen minutes for each participant.
Upon arriving, participants were provided with informed consent information and given
the opportunity to ask any questions they may have. Half of the participants completed the
demographic and self-report mindfulness forms first, and the other half began the study visit with
the attention tasks. Both the order of the mindfulness measures and the attention tasks were
counterbalanced across participants.
A brief practice period preceded each attention task to assure that the participants
understood the instructions. For the cued Stroop task this also allowed participants to become
familiar with the microphone, and to assure that the voice-activated relay was working properly.
The microphone was positioned approximately 4” to 6” from participant’s mouths and they were
asked to, “speak up, and try and avoid preceding their response with any other sound.”
Data Analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 14.0 (SPSS) was used to store
and analyze data. Individual Linear regression analyses were used to examine the relation
between self-report mindfulness scores and performance on the attention tasks, specifically to
test the hypothesis that higher self-report mindfulness scores would be related to better
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performance on tasks of attention. Attention task scores (DVs) were regressed onto self-report
mindfulness scores (IVs). Prior to any analyses, data were inspected for errors, excessive missing
cases, and outliers, defined as scores greater or less than three standard deviations from the
mean. One outlier was removed from the D-KEFS Inhibition Errors scaled score. The scaled
score of 1 fell 3.28 standard deviations below the mean. Two outliers were identified from the
CPT-II Omissions T-scores. The T-scores of 70.98 and 71.8 fell 3.54 and 3.66 standard
deviations above the mean respectively. For the cued Stroop task, only data from the color
naming conditions were included in the present analysis. These data were examined for outliers
in order to remove anticipations (RTs that were less than 300ms) and lapses in attention (RTs
greater than 1500 ms) as recommended by Macleod (2005). Three data points were removed
from the control condition (<1%), and 16 were removed from the incongruent color naming
condition (<1%). In addition, participant errors and technical errors (instances when the
microphone did not register the participant’s initial response) were removed from the cued
Stroop data prior to calculating Stroop interference scores. Eight participant errors were made
during the control condition (<1%), and 187 during the incongruent color naming condition
(8.31%). There were 18 technical errors during the control condition (<1%), and 20 during the
incongruent color naming condition (<1%). Due to administrator error, one participant did not
complete the CAMS-R, and one participant’s CPT-II data was invalid due to participant error.
These participant’s data were excluded from relevant analyses.
With the goal of obtaining the best linear unbiased estimates, the assumptions of
regression were tested according to the guidelines provided by Field (2005). Several variables
failed to meet the assumptions of normality (CPT-II Omissions T-score, the number of errors
from the cued Stroop task, the D-KEFS Inhibition Error Analysis score, & the D-KEFS
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Inhibition/Switching Error Analysis score). Log transformations were performed and parallel
analyses were performed on both the raw scores and transformations of the raw scores. Because
the analyses revealed comparable results, the analyses of untransformed scores are reported.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. Relations among the
mindfulness questionnaires can be seen in Table 2. All were significantly positively correlated
with each other suggesting that each questionnaire is measuring a similar aspect of the construct
of mindfulness. Table 3 outlines the relations between the different attention tasks. All
significant correlations were in the expected direction except for the relationship between the
Switching vs. Inhibition scaled scores and the Inhibition scaled scores of the D-KEFS. This
negative relationship implies that for this sample those who performed better on selective
attention tended to score lower on the task of attention switching ability. Results from the
individual regression analyses examining the relationship between self-report mindfulness and
performance on tasks of sustained, selective, and switching attention are presented in Tables 4, 5,
and 6 respectively.
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Table 1
Descriptive Information for the self-report mindfulness measures and the attention tasks
Variable
Self-report mindfulness

Descriptive Statistics
Mean

SD

Min

Max

55

9.36

36

69

KIMS – act with awareness scale

27.84

5.16

18

39

CAMS-R

31.18

3.94

25

42

PASAT %

52.35

12.85

29.17

75.83

CPT-II Omissions T-scores

46.07

4.46

40.86

62

CPT-II Hit RT Std. Error T-scores

48.05

9.11

23.85

67.31

158.98

52.7

54.91

280.99

Cued Stroop Color Naming Errors

3.74

3.42

0

13

D-KEFS Inhibition vs. Color Naming SS

11.08

1.83

6

16

D-KEFS Inhibition Error SS

10.18

2.45

3

13

D-KEFS Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition

9.96

2.14

4

16

D-KEFS Inhibition/Switching Error SS

10.62

1.77

6

13

MAAS

Sustained attention

Selective attention
Cued Stroop Interference scores

Attention switching

Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale; CAMS-R =
Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised; PASAT % = Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test percentage score;
CPT-II = Continuous Performance Test – II; D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System; SS = scaled
score.
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Table 2
Intercorrelations among Mindfulness Questionnaires
KIMS act with awareness

CAMS-R

.30*

.42**

1

.42**

MAAS
KIMS act with awareness

Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness
Scale; CAMS-R = Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised.
*

p < .05, **p < .01

Table 3
Intercorrelations among the tasks of sustained, selective, and attention switching tasks
Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

-.12

-.40**

-.21

-.21

.16

.10

-.22

-.07

1

.14

.08

.24

-.11

-.16

.06

.12

1

-.02

-.09

-.10

-.01

.15

.13

1

.16

.17

.05

.17

.36*

1

-.07

-.36*

.04

-.05

1

.28

-.5**

-.06

1

-.23

.20

1

.34*

Sustained attention
PASAT1
CPT-II Omissions2
CPT-II Hit RT Std. Error3
Selective attention
Stroop Interference scores4
Stroop Errors5
D-KEFS Inhibition6
D-KEFS Inhibition Errors7
Attention switching
D-KEFS Switching8
D-KEFS Switching Errors9

1

Note. PASAT = Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test percentage score; CPT-II = Continuous Performance Test
– II; D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System.
*

p < .05, **p < .01
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Sustained Attention
There was a significant association between the number of target omissions from
the CPT-II (Omissions T-score) and self-report mindfulness as measured by the MAAS, t(46) =
-3.94, p < .001, and the CAMS-R, t(45) = -3.49, p < .01, such that those scoring higher on selfreport mindfulness had fewer target omissions than those scoring lower on mindfulness.
However, the act with awareness subscale from the KIMS was not significantly associated with
target omissions from the CPT-II, t(46) = -1.40, p = .15. Because of the large number of
regression analyses conducted a Bonferroni correction was applied bringing the significant p
value to .005. The p values obtained remained significant as both were at or less than .001.
There were no significant associations between participant’s RT variability on the CPT-II
(Hit RT Std. Error) and self-report mindfulness, MAAS: t(48) = -.44; KIMS act with awareness:
t(48) = -.95; CAMS-R: t(47) = -.01, all ps ≥ .35. Similarly there were no significant associations
between the percentage of correct responses from the PASAT and self-report mindfulness,
MAAS: t(49) = -.58; KIMS act with awareness: t(49) = 1.65; CAMS-R: t(48) = 1.48, all ps ≥ .11.
Thus, results from the tasks designed to measure sustained attention are mixed. Sustained
attention as measured by target omissions from the CPT-II was significantly associated with selfreport mindfulness as measured by the MAAS and the CAMS-R, but not the act with awareness
subscale from the KIMS. Results suggest that there is not a significant association between selfreport mindfulness and sustained attention as measured by either RT variability on the CPT-II or
PASAT performance.
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Table 4
Results of the Individual Regression Analyses Exploring the Relationship between Self-Report
Mindfulness and Tasks of Sustained Attention
Regression Analysis

R²

b

MAAS

.01

-.11

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.05

β

SEb

t

PASAT %

CAMS-R

.05

.2

.58 .35
.69

.47

-.08

-.58

.23

1.65

.21

1.48

CPT-II Omission T-scores
MAAS

.26

-.23

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.05

-.18 .12

CAMS-R

.06 -.51

-3.94**

-.21

-1.47

.22

-.53

.15

-.47

-3.49**

MAAS

.00

-.06

.14

-.07

-.44

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.02

-.24

.26

-.14

-.95

CAMS-R

.00

< -.01

.34

< -.01

-.01

CPT-II Hit RT Std. Error T-scores

Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale;
CAMS-R = Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised; PASAT % = Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test
percentage score; CPT-II = Continuous Performance Test – II.
**p ≤ .001

Selective Attention
Verification of the Stroop effect. Paired samples t-tests revealed a robust Stroop effect
for both the cued Stroop task as well as the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test (measured
using raw data, not scaled scores), Participants had significantly longer RTs in the incongruent
color naming condition than in the control condition, t(49) = -21.33, p < .001, and took longer to
complete the Inhibition condition of the D-KEFS than the control condition of this task, t(49) = 19.92, p < .001. In addition participants made significantly more color naming errors on the
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incongruent color naming portions than the control conditions of these tasks, cued Stroop: t(49)
= -7.45; D-KEFS: t(49) = -5.23, both ps < .001.
Cued Stroop interference scores were not significantly associated with self-report
mindfulness, MAAS: t(49) = .96; KIMS act with awareness: t(49) = 1.3; CAMS-R: t(48) = .41,
all ps ≥ .2. The number of errors made during the incongruent color naming condition of the
cued Stroop task was also not associated with self-report mindfulness, MAAS: t(49) = .32;
KIMS act with awareness: t(49) = .45; CAMS-R: t(48) = -.07, all ps ≥ .66.
Similarly, participants’ performance on the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test was
not associated with self-report mindfulness. Inhibition vs. Color Naming scores, were not
associated with mindfulness scores, MAAS: t(49) = 1.64; KIMS act with awareness: t(49) =
1.97; CAMS-R: t(48) = -1.39, all ps ≥ .11 except for the act with awareness subscale which
approached significance, p = .054. Color naming errors (Inhibition Error Analysis scores) also
failed to significantly predict mindfulness scores MAAS: t(49) = -1.05; KIMS act with
awareness: t(49) = .17; CAMS-R: t(48) = .23, all ps ≥ .3. Results do not support a significant
relationship between self-reported mindfulness and selective attention as measured by a cued
Stroop task, or the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test.
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Table 5
Results of the Individual Regression Analyses Exploring the Relationship between Self-Report
Mindfulness and Tasks of Selective Attention
Regression Analysis

R²

b

β

SEb

t

Cued Stroop Interference scores
MAAS

.02

.77 .81

.14

.96

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.03

1.88 1.45

.18

1.3

.8

.06

.41

.05 .05

.32

.07

.45

CAMS-R

<.01

1.95

Cued Stroop Color Naming Errors
MAAS

<.01

.02

KIMS – act with awareness scale

<.01

.04 .1

CAMS-R

<.01

<.01

.13

-.01

-.07

MAAS

.05

.05

.03

.23

1.64

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.08

.1

.05

.27

1.97

CAMS-R

.04

.09

.07

.2

1.39

MAAS

.02

-.04

.04

-.15

-1.05

KIMS – act with awareness scale

<.01

.01

.07

.03

.17

CAMS-R

<.01

.02

.09

.04

.23

D-KEFS Inhibition vs. Color Naming SS

D-KEFS Inhibition Error SS

Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale;
CAMS-R = Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised; D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning
System.

Attention Switching
No significant association was observed between participant’s performance on the
Inhibition/Switching condition of the D-KEFS (Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition contrast
score) and self-report mindfulness, MAAS: t(49) = .06; KIMS act with awareness: t(49) = -.61;
CAMS-R: t(48) = .5, all ps ≥ .55. Participant’s errors on this condition of the D-KEFS
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(Inhibition/Switching Error Analysis score) also were not significantly associated with selfreport mindfulness, MAAS: t(49) = 1.02; KIMS act with awareness: t(49) = -1; CAMS-R: t(48)
= .07, all ps ≥ .31. Results suggest that there is not a significant association between self-report
mindfulness and attention switching ability as measured by the Inhibition/Switching vs.
Inhibition contrast score, or the Inhibition/Switching Error Analysis score from the D-KEFS.
Table 6
Results of the Individual Regression Analyses Exploring the Relationship between Self-Report
Mindfulness and Attention Switching Tasks
Regression Analysis

R²

b

β

SEb

t

D-KEFS Inhibition/Switching vs. Inhibition
MAAS
KIMS – act with awareness scale
CAMS-R

<.01

<.01 .03

.01

.06

.01

-.04 .06

-.09

-.61

.07

.5

.01

.04

.08

D-KEFS Inhibition/Switching Error SS
MAAS

.02

KIMS – act with awareness scale

.02

CAMS-R

<.01

.03

.03 .15

-.05 .05
.01

.07

1.02

-.14

-1

.01

.07

Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale;
CAMS-R = Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised; D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning
System.

Discussion
The current study sought to further validate the recently developed self-report
mindfulness measures by exploring the relation between participants’ mindfulness scores and
their performance on tasks of attention. The results did not support the hypotheses that selfreport mindfulness would be related to performance on tasks of selective attention, or attention
switching ability. There was mixed support for the relation between mindfulness scores and
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sustained attention performance tasks, such that higher mindfulness scores were negatively
related to target omissions on the CPT-II, but were not related to RT variability on the CPT-II or
PASAT performance. This section places these findings in the context of the measurement of
self-report mindfulness, addresses null findings, and discusses limitations and directions for
future research.
The primary finding from this study is a negative relationship between the number of
target omissions on the CPT-II and participants’ mindfulness scores as measured by the MAAS
and the CAMS-R. Consideration of the requirements of this attention task is helpful in the
interpretation of these results. On this task, to allow a target letter to pass without responding
(target omissions) may be indicative of a more exaggerated lapse in attention, which may better
account for participant’s subjective experience of being unaware of present experience (i.e. lower
self-report mindfulness scores). Baer and Colleagues (2006) note that the MAAS in particular
seems to emphasize “an element of mindfulness related to dissociation and absent-mindedness.”
Thus, participants who score higher on the CAMS-R and the MAAS may be more likely to
display lapses in attention such as those measured by target omissions from the CPT-II. This may
be particularly true for a sample without mediation experience that has not been socialized to the
level of focused attention associated with mindfulness. Qualitatively, the experimenter noted that
participants were often able to report that they missed pressing for a number of targets, or
pressed when they should not have. This may mirror their ability to report lapses in attention,
thus accounting for the significant association between self-report mindfulness and performance
on this task.
Notably a relation was not observed between CPT-II omissions and the act with
awareness subscale from the KIMS. This is unexpected given that this subscale was correlated
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with both the MAAS and the CAMS-R, with Pearson’s rs of .30 and .42 respectively. An
examination of individual items does not suggest any large discrepancy in approaches to
measurement. For example, several items from the MAAS and the KIMS closely mirror each
other; “I drive on ‘automatic pilot’ without paying attention to what I’m doing,” (KIMS act with
awareness) and “I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went there.” (MAAS)
In fact, if any discrepancy exists, one would expect to find it between the CAMS-R and the other
measures, because the CAMS-R includes items measuring one’s tendency to be accepting of
present experience. However, the KIMS act with awareness subscale does include items that
appear more sensitive to capturing one’s experience of highly focused attention (e.g. “When I’m
doing something, I’m only focused on what I’m doing, nothing else”; KIMS item 7) as opposed
to the MAAS and CAMS-R, many of whose items appear to be focused on absent-mindedness.
It also may be significant that past research has found stronger relations among
mindfulness measures than were observed in the present study. In a sample of 115
undergraduates, the KIMS act with awareness subscale was correlated with the MAAS at .57
(Baer et al., 2004). In fact, in the afore mentioned study three of the four KIMS subscales were
positively correlated with MAAS scores, whereas only the act with awareness subscale was
significantly related to MAAS scores in the present study. This discrepancy may be the result of
the smaller sample size used in the present study (n = 50). The weaker correlations among selfreport mindfulness measures observed in the present study, may explain in part the lack of
relation between target omissions and the KIMS act with awareness subscale.
Mindfulness scores were not related to sustained attention as measured by the variability
in participant’s RTs on the CPT-II, or the percentage of correct responses on the PASAT. First, it
is notable that the PASAT and the Hit RT Std. Error scores were moderately correlated with each
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other (r = .40), but not related to the CPT-II omissions score (r = -.12 & .14 in the expected
directions) suggesting that target omissions from this task is measuring a different aspect of
sustained attention than the other tasks. As discussed above, target omissions may better
represent lapses of attention. Similarly, RT variability on the CPT-II may measure a degree of
focused attention ability that is required to produce consistent RTs (in milliseconds), and that
may not be related to participant’s self-report of subjective experience of awareness of the
present moment, particularly in a sample without meditation experience. In other words, those
with meditation experience may be more discriminating in how they rate their attention to
present experience, whereas those without mindfulness training are more likely to recognize only
gross lapses in attention and endorse accordingly. This may explain why CPT-II omissions were
significantly related to self-report mindfulness (MAAS & CAMS-R), and RT variability was not.
Similar consideration of the task requirements of the PASAT may also help to understand
this null finding. Although the PASAT is most largely related to attention, it is recognized as a
measure of multiple cognitive functions, including working memory and processing speed
(Tombaugh, 2006). Whereas sustained attention is required to maintain vigilance during this
difficult task, correct responding also requires the ability to hold numerical information in
working memory while simultaneously performing arithmetic. This task is a good illustration of
how difficult it can be to parse out different aspects of executive functioning. For example,
working memory and attention are thought to be highly related, and performance of one is likely
intertwined with performance of the other. In addition Tombaugh (2006) reports that the PASAT
is a highly sensitive test that is negatively impacted by low math ability. Further research
conducted with this task may consider including a test such as the Math Fluency subtest from the
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Woodcock Johnson-III Achievement battery to control for arithmetic ability under timed
conditions.
Although findings regarding the relation between self-report mindfulness and sustained
attention were mixed, results suggest that continued research is warranted in this area. Whereas
these attention tasks fall under the umbrella of sustained attention, lack of correlation between
performances on these tasks suggests measurement of varied sustained attention skills. Further
research should focus on replicating the finding that the relation between sustained attention and
self-report mindfulness is better explained in the measurement of more exaggerated lapses in
attention, as may be indicated by target omissions from the CPT-II. Alternate versions of the
CPT that require responding to a small ratio of targets vs. non-targets should also be considered,
as they are thought to be even more sensitive to the measurement of lapses in sustained attention
(Hsieh et al., 2004).
The hypotheses that self-report mindfulness would be related to selective attention and
attention switching ability were not supported. This was true for performance on both the cued
Stroop task as well as the Color-Word Interference test from the D-KEFS. One explanation for
this null finding may reside in the restricted range of mindfulness scores obtained in the present
study. The means and standard deviations for all three instruments (MAAS, KIMS act with
awareness, & CAMS-R) were very closely matched to those obtained in other student samples
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer et al., 2004; & Feldman et al., 2005). As part of the validity
assessment of these measures, researchers have noted that those with mediation experience score
significantly higher on self-report mindfulness than do student samples (Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Baer et al., 2004; & Feldman et al., 2005). This is important because past research sighting a
relation between mindfulness skill and attention has reported group differences between controls
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and experienced meditators. Thus, the comparisons have been between student or control
samples with student self-report mindfulness scores equivalent to those in the present study, and
meditation groups scoring significantly higher on self-report mindfulness. This leaves open the
possibility that the previously documented relation between meditation experience and attention
ability (Valentine & Sweet, 1999, Rani & Andhra, 2000; Rani & Rao, 1996; Linden, 1973) is
curvilinear, such that a certain amount of experience or a certain level of mindfulness skill is
necessary before actual improvements in attention take place. This is consistent with the findings
of Valentine and Sweet (1999) who reported group differences between meditators and nonmeditators on a sustained attention task, but further noted that amongst meditators, the amount of
meditation experience was a significant predictor of task performance.
The idea that qualitative shifts may take place with the acquisition of mindfulness skills is
not new. Other research has noted that certain facets of mindfulness may change as one gains
meditation experience (Baer et al., 2004; Baer et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). Amongst a
student sample, Baer and colleagues (2006) found that the tendency to observe more subtle
stimuli in one’s environment was negatively correlated with the tendency to allow experiences
without judging them (acceptance). They suggested that without training in attitudes of
acceptance, the tendency to observe experience is likely to be associated with judgment of this
experience. When the same relationship was examined amongst a group with meditation
experience, there was a positive correlation between the “observe” and “acceptance” facets of
mindfulness. It is possible that just as the relation between observance and acceptance of present
experience appears to change with increased mindfulness skill, so may the relation between selfreport mindfulness and attention. Future work should explore the relationship between self-report
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mindfulness and attention ability with a sample that includes experienced meditators in order to
address the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between these variables.
The self-report measures of mindfulness included in the present study were designed to
measure one’s tendency to be aware of present experience over time, or what one might term as
trait mindfulness. Some prior work has found evidence that improvements in attention ability are
only achieved shortly after mindfulness meditation, or when one may be in a more mindful state
(Rani & Rao, 2000). It is notable that prior validation of these mindfulness measures has almost
exclusively involved comparisons with other self-report instruments; (i.e. comparing trait
mindfulness to other traits). The exception was a follow-up study from Brown and Ryan (2003)
who found that, in a student sample, 29% of the variation in state mindfulness was accounted for
by trait mindfulness. Although this association between state and trait mindfulness was
significant, it attributes 71% of state mindfulness variance to within-person variability. Further,
this study found that state and trait mindfulness contributed independently to measures of wellbeing. What these findings suggest is that, within student samples, there is a considerable amount
of variance in state mindfulness. Therefore, the trait measures used in the present study may not
be sensitive enough to capture current mindful states that would be expected to be related to
attention. This is because all previous research demonstrating a relation between mindfulness
and attention has either used experienced meditators or those who have just completed a
mindfulness exercise, and are in a mindful state. This begs the question as to whether
mindfulness may be better conceptualized as a state in a population without meditation
experience. Future research should address differences in both state and trait mindfulness as it
relates to attention ability. The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Bishop et al., 2003), which assesses
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the degree to which one is able to reach a mindful state during meditation, might be useful is
such a study.
The present study attempted to focus on attentional ability. Future research should also
include an examination of the relation between self-report mindfulness and attentional bias.
Shapiro and colleagues (2006) suggest that mindfulness involves a type of inhibition that may be
capable of interrupting attentional bias processes. They describe that true experiencing of the
present moment, involves “suspending” all interpretation of experience. They suggest that this
may involve inhibition of “secondary elaborative processing” or the additional processing of
thoughts, emotions, or sensations that occurs when interpretation of stimuli occurs. This has been
termed as “cognitive inhibition” by Williams and colleagues (1996), and may be measured
through tasks such as an emotional Stroop task or dot-probe paradigms. This research is
complicated by the difficulty of reliably detecting attentional biases in non-clinical samples
(MacLeod, 2005); therefore, clinical samples may be better suited for future studies of this kind.
Additionally, it may be interesting to examine whether mindfulness training reduces attentional
biases in a clinical sample. Measuring these biases pre- and post a mindfulness intervention may
provide a means of comparing changes in self-report mindfulness with an objective measure of
improvement in attentional bias.
In summary, this study points the way toward future work examining the association
of attention and self-report mindfulness. The mixed results regarding the relation between selfreport mindfulness and sustained attention suggest that this is an area in need of further study.
Replication of these findings with attention to discriminating between lapses in attention and
subtle variation in focused attention is a first step. Although the prediction that self-report
mindfulness would be related to selective attention and attention switching ability were not
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supported, further research should be conducted with a sample representing a larger range of
mindfulness scores (e.g. those with mediation experience) to determine whether a curvilinear
relationship exists between these variables. Work examining the association of both state and
trait mindfulness with attention may help to further examine whether mindfulness is best
characterized (and measured) as a state or a trait in samples without meditation experience.
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Appendix A
Demographic Information
Subject #________

Date:__________

Please fill out the following information
1. Age _______________________________________________________________
2. Date of Birth _________________________________________________________
3. Year/Classification in Georgia State _______________________________________
4. Place of Birth (city, state, country) ________________________________________
5. Marital status:

Married_____ Single______ Divorced______ Separated______

Living with someone_____ Widowed_____
6. Gender:

Male ______ Female ______

7. Have you ever had formal or informal meditation training? (e.g. meditation classes, yoga, or
self-help tapes or books) Yes_____ No_____
If yes, please elaborate. Please include the amount of time spent meditating (hours
per week) past or current, as well as length of practice (e.g. “I have been going to yoga once a
week for two hours for the past six months.”): _________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
8. Your racial/ethnic origin (please check one)
African American

____

Caucasian

____

Hispanic

____
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Asian American

____

Biracial/multiracial

____

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

____

American Indian/ Alaska Native

____

Other (please specify)

________________

9. Current total annual household income (check one):
Less than $5,000

____

$5,000 – $10,000

____

$10,000 – $20,000

____

$20,000 – $30,000

____

$30,000 - $50,000

____

$50,000 - $75,000

____

More than $75,000

____

10. Do you wear glasses or corrective lenses? Yes_____ No_____
If yes, do you feel your vision is adequately corrected? _____________________
11. Do you have any history of color blindness? Yes_____ No_____
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Appendix B
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS)
Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experiences. Using the 1-6 scale below,
please indicate how frequently or infrequently you have each experience. Please answer
according to what really reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience
should be.
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6
almost always

almost never

______1. I could be experiencing some emotion, and not be conscious of it until some
time later.
______2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking
of something else.
______3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.
______4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying attention to what
I experience along the way.
______5. I tend not to notice feelings of tension or physical discomfort until they really
grab my attention.
______6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time.
______7. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m
doing.
______8. I rush through activities without really being attentive to them.
______9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I
am doing right now to get there.
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______10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I am doing.
______11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the
same time.
______12. I drive places on “automatic pilot” and then wonder why I went there.
______13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.
______14. I find myself doing things without paying attention.
______15. I snack without being aware that I am eating.
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Appendix C
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) Bolded items load on the Act with Awareness
sub-scale.
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Write the number in the
blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.

1

2

3

4

5

Never or very
rarely true

Rarely true

Sometimes true

Often true

Very often or
always true

_____1. I notice changes in my body, such as whether my breathing slows down or speeds up.
_____2. I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings.
_____3. When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted.
_____4. I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions.
_____5. I pay attention to whether my muscles are tense or relaxed.
_____6. I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words.
_____7. When I’m doing something, I’m only focused on what I’m doing, nothing else.
_____8. I tend to evaluate whether my perceptions are right or wrong.
_____9. When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving.
_____10. I’m good at thinking of words to express my perceptions, such as how things taste,
smell, or sound.
_____11. I drive on “automatic pilot” without paying attention to what I’m doing.
_____12. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling.
_____13. When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body.
_____14. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking.
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_____15. When I’m reading, I focus all my attention on what I’m reading.
_____16. I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way.
_____17. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions.
_____18. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things.
_____19. When I do things, I get totally wrapped up in them and don’t think about
anything else.
_____20. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad.
_____21. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face.
_____22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because I can’t
find the right words.
_____23. I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or
otherwise distracted.
_____24. I tend to make judgments about how worthwhile or worthless my experiences are.
_____25. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.
_____26. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.
_____27. When I’m doing chores, such as cleaning or laundry, I tend to daydream or think
of other things.
_____28. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking.
_____29. I notice the smells and aromas of things.
_____30. I intentionally stay aware of my feelings.
_____31. I tend to do several things at once rather than focusing on one thing at a time.
_____32. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them.
_____33. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of
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light and shadow.
_____34. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words.
_____35. When I’m working on something, part of my mind is occupied with other topics,
such as what I’ll be doing later, or things I’d rather be doing.
_____36. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas.
_____37. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior.
_____38. I get completely absorbed in what I’m doing, so that all my attention is focused on
it.
_____39. I notice when my moods begin to change.
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Appendix D
Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale – Revised (CAMS-R)
People have a variety of ways of relating to their thoughts and feelings. For each of the items
below, rate how much each of these ways applies to you.
1

2

3

4

Rarely/Not at all

Sometimes

Often

Almost Always

______ 1.

It is easy for me to concentrate on what I am doing.

______ 2.

I am preoccupied by the future.

______ 3.

I can tolerate emotional pain.

______ 4.

I can accept things I cannot change.

______ 5.

I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail.

______ 6.

I am easily distracted.

______ 7.

I am preoccupied by the past.

______ 8.

It’s easy for me to keep track of my thoughts and feelings.

______ 9.

I try to notice my thoughts without judging them.

______ 10.

I am able to accept the thoughts and feelings I have.

______ 11.

I am able to focus on the present moment.

______ 12.

I am able to pay close attention to one thing for a long period of time.

